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Center Overview

The mission of the Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES) is to reduce threats to the nation’s power delivery systems by developing capabilities that can rapidly detect cyberattacks, enable infrastructure to continue to operate in the presence of such attacks, and quickly restore infrastructure after an attack.

Power and energy delivery systems — including electric power, oil and gas, energy markets, and the infrastructure supporting electric vehicles, smart buildings, and smart cities — depend increasingly on cybertechnology. Even legacy systems that use closed serial communications can be exposed to adversaries through networking, and are increasingly targeted by nation-states and independent actors. The threat to critical infrastructure is worldwide, with energy systems being of highest priority when it comes to the need for security.

CITES focuses on the trustworthiness of power and energy systems in developing security solutions specific to their protection, and increases the resilience, reliability, safety, and cybersecurity of these power delivery systems at the operational level in novel ways that expand on traditional IT system protection strategies.

CITES brings together uniquely qualified academic researchers in partnership with a diverse group of private sector stakeholders, trade associations, and national laboratories who share this vision. CITES is also creating a larger pool of students with training and skills in this area of national importance, and increasing the number of university faculty members who are able to make foundational contributions to trustworthy energy systems. To broaden diversity in the field, CITES recruits faculty members as well as graduate and undergraduate students from populations historically underrepresented in such work.

CITES aims to affect how decision-makers in energy view and make investments to improve the trustworthiness of their own infrastructures. Through its industrial interactions and outreach, CITES is helping create a larger cyber-savvy operational technology workforce. Together, CITES’s technical, educational, and outreach activities and innovations have an impact on society and provide collaborative opportunities to develop new technologies that support national security.

Universities

  • University of Arkansas
  • Florida International University
  • University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
View Center Website

Center Personnel

Dominic Saebeler
Industry Liaison
+1 217 300 6109
dsaeb2@illinois.edu

Osama Mohammed
Site Director
+1 305 348 3040
mohammed@fiu.edu

David Nicol
Center Director
+1 217 244 1925
dmnicol@illinois.edu

Qinghua Li
Site Director
+1 479 575 6416
qinghual@uark.edu

Research Focus

CITES pursues security-focused research across a range of areas that include:

  • Energy system protection: Advances software and hardware technologies for protecting energy systems from cyber malfeasance. This broad area includes intrusion detection tailored to energy systems, technologies for describing and analyzing cyberattacks and defenses in energy systems, hardware support for device identification, decision aids for the application of security controls in energy systems, security for micro-electronics, and evaluation of access control devices against formalized security policies typical in energy systems.
  • Interacting systems: New devices, applications, and systems designed to improve security are often envisioned without considering the dependence that the security they provide has on the security of the new entity itself. For example, the introduction of public key infrastructure (PKI) within an operational technology (OT) network necessitates the introduction of a certificate server, which, if compromised or inaccessible, inhibits the security apparatus that depends on the PKI. The challenge is to identify techniques, methodologies, and/or analyses that help one to identify, consider, or forestall the risks attendant with the introduction of that technology.
  • Data trust and integrity: Grid modernization increases reliance on data for human and machine-assisted management of grid operations. Emerging technologies such as machine learning and other advanced analytics increase that data dependency by several orders of magnitude. New concepts like zero trust challenge traditional data architecture assumptions. The use of digital twins for near real-time and real-time simulations requires data from multiple sources to describe operating conditions.
  • Intra-level security management: The classic Purdue model for OT systems defines system layers Enterprise, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Operational and Control, Process, and, Physical, conceptualized as a “North-South.” A layer is often treated as a single security zone, with security policies (like Biba) imposed between them. The problem is that better trust management is required within a layer. The challenge is to understand how to introduce so-called "East-West" management of security.
  • Secure digital infrastructure for energy: Society is on the cusp of a new energy ecosystem, driven by requirements for efficiency and decarbonization as well as advances in energy sources, electric transportation, and market models. Realizing this vision will require a secure digital infrastructure for secure interoperability, trust relations among multiple stakeholder communities, secure and verifiable transactions, integration of nonconventional forms of generating energy at multiple grid scales, and secure cloud operations.
  • Secure software development and life cycle: Design and implementation flaws in software components are significant factors that lead to compromised computer systems. Security must be built in from the start, and part of that involves the methodologies and testing used in the development of that software, and throughout its entire life cycle (requirements, planning, design, development, testing, deployment, maintenance).
  • Zero-trust networking: Provenance, authentication, integrity, and policy checking must be pusehd to edge devices in the network.

Awards

Member Organizations

IUCRC affiliated member organizations are displayed as submitted by the Center. Non-federal organizations are not selected, approved, or otherwise endorsed by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the Center author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. National Science Foundation.